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ABSTRACT
An unresolved question concerning post-Civil War U.S. industrialization is the degree to
which import tariffs protected domestic manufacturers from foreign competition.  This paper
considers the impact of import tariffs on the domestic pig iron industry, the basic building block of
the entire iron and steel industry.  After reviewing the contentious political debate surrounding the
pig iron duties and estimating the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported pig iron,
a standard trade model provides estimates of how tariff reductions would affect domestic prices,
production, imports, and welfare.  The results suggest that, had the tariff been eliminated in 1869,
domestic output would fall by about 15 percent and the import market share would rise from about
7 percent to nearly 30 percent.  These relatively modest effects suggest that a substantial portion of
the domestic industry could have survived a significant tariff reduction.
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I.  Introduction
An unresolved question concerning U.S. industrialization after the Civil War is the degree to
which import tariffs protected domestic manufacturers from foreign competition.  The role of the tariff in
assisting the iron and steel industry has been particularly controversial in view of the industry’s growth
from a fledgling import-competing sector in the mid-nineteenth century to the largest manufacturing
sector in the United States by the end of the century.  Industry representatives argued at the time that
high tariffs were critical to its survival and successful growth.  Later independent assessments stressed
America’s abundance of natural resources, technological advances, and expanding domestic demand as
the key factors, but were equivocal about the importance of the tariff.  A representative claim that
“neither the general trend nor the annual fluctuations [in domestic production] appear to be perceptibly
influenced by downward changes in the tariff,” for example, is hedged with the caveat that “without the
duty the industry would have encountered severe foreign competition which might have hampered its
development.”1
How important was import protection to the post-Civil War iron and steel industry, an industry
that began on such a small scale yet became an industrial giant?  What would have been the
consequences of a significant tariff reduction or even free trade on the industry’s output?  How did the
import-substitution policy affect economic welfare?  Despite the importance of these questions to our
understanding of America’s mid- to late-nineteenth century industrial development, economic historians
have not established a consensus view of the role of the tariff.  Early qualitative discussions of iron-2-
2    Taussig (1915, p. 151) suggested that “no one can say with certainty what would have
been” the effects on the industry without the tariff, but conjectured that “the same sort of growth would
doubtless have taken place eventually, tariff or no tariff; but not so soon or on so great a scale.”  Temin
(1964, p. 213) wrote that “the tariff increased the incentive of American manufacturers to expand their
production, although the extent of this increase cannot be known.”
3  Sundararajan (1970) and Baack and Ray (1973) use reduced form regressions to suggest
that the tariff played a dominant role in promoting the domestic pig iron industry.  Yet Sundararajan
found a significant but negative coefficient on the tariff before 1890 and insignificant results thereafter,
while Baack and Ray found a positive and significant effect of the tariff only after 1900, a period when
the United States was a frequent net exporter of pig iron.  Furthermore, they fail to identify supply and
demand or to calculate the magnitude of the tariff’s impact on domestic production.  The more recent
studies of Head (1994) and Irwin (2000) will be discussed further below.
protection by Taussig (1915) and Temin (1964)  tended to be agnostic about its effects.2  Subsequent
quantitative studies, in particular those by Sundararajan (1970) and Baack and Ray (1973), failed to
reach definitive conclusions about the importance of the tariff.3  Thus, the effects on protection on the
post-Civil War iron and steel industry is still an open question. 
This paper seeks to determine the impact of tariff protection on domestic pig iron production,
the basic building block of the iron and steel industry, around 1869.  Pig iron, the product of blast
furnaces, is an intermediate stage of iron fabrication used by rolling mills to produce iron sheets, rails,
and bars, and by other mills to produce nails, wire, and related products.  The pig iron tariff raised the
domestic price of this intermediate product to a host of other import-competing, iron-consuming
industries and was therefore particularly controversial after the Civil War.  Section II reviews the
contentious political debate over the pig iron tariff.  Section III provides estimates of the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported pig iron, a parameter that is crucial to determining the
effect of the tariff on the domestic industry.  Section IV then employs a standard trade model to assess
the impact of tariff changes on imports, domestic output, and domestic and import prices.  This model-3-
4  In July 1866, Wells remarked that “I have changed my ideas respecting tariffs and protection
very much since coming to Washington. . . . I am utterly disgusted with the rapacity and selfishness
suggests that domestic output would have fallen about 15 percent and the import market share would
have risen from about 7 percent to almost 30 percent had free trade been adopted in 1869.  Section V
concludes by putting these findings in the perspective of other related research.  
II.  The Debate over the Pig Iron Tariff 
Congress engaged in an extensive debate after the Civil War over the possible reduction of the
high import tariffs that had been imposed during the war.  Many tariffs had been raised in conjunction
with higher direct taxes on domestic producers, but were not reduced when those domestic taxes were
abolished.  Congress raised the tariff on pig iron imports to $9 per ton in 1864, for example, in part to
counterbalance a domestic tax of $2 per ton levied on domestic producers.  Although the domestic tax
was eliminated in 1866, the $9 duty remained in effect. The pig iron tariff, along with other tariffs on
intermediate goods and raw materials, was especially controversial.  Any measure that raised the cost
of production of iron-consuming industries, themselves often import-competing final goods producers,
came under particular scrutiny.  
The question facing Congress in the immediate post-war period was whether or not to reduce
these import duties.  The Special Commissioner of the Revenue, David Wells, strongly urged Congress
to cut tariffs, the pig iron duties foremost among them.  Originally a protectionist, Wells became
obsessed with what he perceived were the inequities of the tariff.  With increasing stridency, he
attacked high protective duties in his annual reports.4  In his report for 1868, Wells argued that the pig-4-
which I have seen displayed by Penn[sylvania] people, and some from other sections on this subject.”
Quoted in Joyner (1939, p. 44).  
5  Report of the Special Commissioner of Revenue for the year 1868, pp. 46ff.
iron tariff was “a striking illustration of an instance where a duty originally levied for revenue and
protection, or as an offset to internal taxes, has been continued long after its object has been fully
attained, for the interests of the few, but to the detriment of the many.”  According to his report, the
domestic cost of producing pig iron was roughly $26 per ton, but the duty raised the domestic price to
at least $37 per ton.  The difference, he argued, was pure profit for domestic producers:  “The
manufacturers of pig iron have, to the detriment of the rolling-mill interest, and to the expense of every
consumer of iron from rail to a ploughshare, and from a boiler plate to a tenpenny nail, realized
continued profits which have hardly any parallel in the history of legitimate industry.”5 
In his next and final report, Wells again singled out pig iron as “a conspicuous example” of
where “excessive and unnecessary duties have been imposed and maintained, with a view of enhancing
the costs of articles indispensable to many other branches of production; and this, too, with a full
knowledge and demonstration of the fact that the detriment thereby brought to industry in general, far
outweighs any measure of benefit which can possibly accrue to the special or class interest thus
favored.”  “The usual and almost the only argument offered in reply to such” criticisms, Wells observed,
“is that a continuation of the present duties imposed on pig iron is necessary to insure employment to
American labor.”  Wells countered by charging that high pig iron prices reduced employment even
more in the many other industries that required iron as a major input to production, such as construction
and railroads.  He speculated that lower pig iron prices would enable the shipbuilding industry to sell an-5-
6  Report of the Special Commissioner of Revenue for the year 1869, p. 83.
7  Ibid., p. 86.
additional 600 iron ships, requiring the employment of 30,000 workers — “more than two and a half
times as many are at present directly engaged in the manufacture of pig iron.”6  
Wells held that a tariff reduction would not spell disaster for domestic producers.  “All the facts
show that a reduction or entire repeal of the duty would in no degree affect the manufacture” because
domestic profits would simply fall.  “Under an abatement or repeal of the duty no more pig iron would
be imported than at present, for the American manufacturer would simply reduce his price, and thus
retain, as now, full command of the domestic market.”  A tariff cut was thus in order:  “In view,
therefore, of the above facts, the Commissioner would recommend a reduction of the existing duty of
nine dollars per ton on the importation of pig iron to three dollars; and in this recommendation the
Commissioner has good and sufficient reason to believe that he is sustained by a majority of the
proprietors of rolling mills and other workers of iron, who are not at the same time interested in the
production of pig iron; while members of the American Iron and Steel Association have not hesitated to
express their sympathy with any movement looking to some abatement of duty in this particular.”7 
Wells’s criticism of existing tariffs created a firestorm among protectionist members of
Congress, some of whom sought to stop publication of his report and payment of his salary.  The
House Committee on Manufactures investigated Wells and complained that “they do not conceive the
promulgation of special theories to have been part of the duty imposed upon the commissioner.”  The
Republican majority accused him of using “fallacious and unreliable” statistics on cost of pig iron
production and therefore reaching conclusions that were “grievously in error” and which aimed “to-6-
8  Examination of Statements in the Report of Special Commissioner of Revenue, House Report
No. 72, 41st Congress, 2nd Session, May 19, 1870, pp. 33, 63, 65.
9  Several minority members attached a dissent in which they argued that “the majority of the
committee seem to consider the manufacturing interest of the country confined to mines, furnaces, and
mills, forgetting that, however important these branches of industry may be, they only furnish the raw
materials for industries immensely greater and of vastly more importance to the consumers of the
country.”  Ibid., p. 119.
10  Congressional Globe, January 11, 1870, pp. 369ff.  Ibid., March 25, 1870, pp. 201, 209. 
subvert the protective policy of our country.”8  The committee produced testimony from industry
representatives suggesting that domestic production costs were around $32-35 per ton, close to the
prevailing price, rather than the lower costs and higher profits implied by Wells’s figures.9
William D. Kelley, a representative from Pennsylvania known as “Pig Iron Kelley” for his
trenchant support of iron and steel interests, repeatedly attacked Wells in speeches before Congress. 
The Wells report, he charged, “abounds in propositions inimical to the best interests of the country.” 
Protection was a “boon to the American consumer” because, Kelly argued, “protection invariably
cheapens commodities.”  The tariff led to greater domestic output which raised the wages of labor, but
also stimulated competition and technological advances that ultimately reduced prices.  Free trade
would fail to guarantee low prices, Kelley stated, because then the country would be at the mercy of
foreign monopolists:  “The day the telegraph announces that we have reduced the duty on pig and
railroad iron will be the day on which the price of British iron will go up.”10  Other members of
Congress defended Wells’s integrity and reiterated his argument that high tariffs on intermediate goods
were not desirable from the standpoint of consuming industries.  One representative described the high
price of pig iron as “an incubus that is weighing us down” and preventing other manufacturing industries-7-
11  Congressional Globe, March 25, 1870, pp. 218ff.
12  The AISA even claimed that “the consumers of three quarters of all the pig iron made in the
country not only did not ask for the reduction of the duty from nine dollars to seven dollars per ton, but
actually opposed on the ground that it would check the vast preparations at that time being made to
increase home production, and enlightened consumers of iron of all kinds know that their interests are
promoted by the prevalence of a policy that gives them a home supply of the materials used in their
business, at a price regulated by an uninterrupted home competition.”  Quoted in Hogan (1974, p.
175).  These statements represented the views of James Swank, the staunchly protectionist secretary of
the AISA, not necessarily the full membership of that organization.  See Tedesco (1985).
from flourishing, dubbing it the “destroyer of our shipyards, the robber of all classes, the retarder of
railroad progress.”  Another dismissed as “absolutely preposterous” Kelley’s claim that protection
reduces prices.11 
Although various tariff bills floundered in 1867-68, Congress reduced revenue tariffs (on such
goods as tea, coffee, sugar, and wine) in March 1870, but maintained most protective duties and even
increased a few (such as on marble, steel rails, and nickel).  The only compromise on the protectionist
duties was a 22 percent reduction in the pig iron tariff, from $9 to $7 per ton.  The American Iron and
Steel Association (AISA) denounced this action:  “the recent reduction in the duty on pig iron by the
Forty-first Congress was unwise, and injurious to the general interests of the country: that in this cause
mainly should be attributed the fact that the make [i.e., the production of pig iron] in 1871 did not
exceed that of 1869, as many contemplated” (quoted in Hogan 1971, p. 174).  The AISA feared the
tariff cut would effectively “transfer the duties thereby lost to the Treasury to the pockets of foreign
manufacturers,” thereby implying a significant terms of trade loss for the United States.12  
The modest reduction in 1870 was followed by a 10 percent cut in all import duties in 1872,
but the lower $6.30 per ton pig iron tariff was short lived due to its repeal in 1875.  Yet political interest-8-
13   Quoted in Tariff Commission (1882), p. 839.  In asking that the duty be raised to $8 per
ton, one manufacturer wrote that “the duty on pig iron is mainly a protection to American labor against
the cheap and poorly paid labor of Europe” (ibid., p. 2175).
in tariff reform continued and, in the early 1880s, Congress appointed a Tariff Commission to gather
views on a possible tariff change.  Not surprisingly, pig iron producers voiced the opinion that the tariff
should not be reduced.  One Michigan manufacturer stated that he had virtually no profit margin, and
that “any reduction of the price caused by a reduced tariff . . . must be followed either by depriving the
workman of labor, or lowering his wages.”13  A few iron users argued for lower tariffs:  one shelf
hardware manufacturer said that the industry could compete better with lower cost materials and that
the pig iron tariff simply protected large profits of producers who got by using outdated equipment. 
Another civil engineer reported that employment in bridge construction would be substantially higher but
for the high domestic price of pig iron.
The Tariff Commission recommended a slight reduction in the pig iron tariff, from $7 per ton to
$6.72 per ton.  Their report (1882, pp. 17-18) went on to caution that “it is believed by the
commission that a further reduction of the duty on pig-iron than that recommended would result
disastrously to that important industry,” noting that imports comprised over 10 percent of domestic
consumption and that the ad valorem duty was only 34 percent.  Considering “the present depressed
condition of the industry, a radical reduction would be neither wise nor politic,” they argued.  
Congress adopted the Tariff Commission’s recommendation in legislation passed in March
1883.  Pig iron output soared during the 1880s, however, due to booming railroad construction and
higher domestic demand for iron and steel products in general.  Although the pig iron tariff continued to-9-
be controversial, no further changes occurred until 1894, when Democratic tariff legislation reduced the
duty to $4.00 per ton.  By then, U.S. producers were much less dependent upon the tariff than they had
been two decades earlier as the United States was on the verge of becoming a major net exporter of
iron and steel products.  
III.  The Elasticity of Substitution between Domestic and Imported Pig Iron 
While the tariff debate in the two decades after the Civil War focused particular attention on pig
iron, the economic impact of the pig iron tariff and the possible consequences of its removal remains an
open question.  The impact of the tariff depends largely on the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported pig iron in U.S. consumption.  If domestic and imported pig iron were imperfect
substitutes and the elasticity of substitution between them low, then the products would not be
significantly in competition with one another.  In that case, any tariff reduction would have a muted
impact on domestic output and trade flows.  By contrast, if the elasticity of substitution was high (the
limiting case is where domestic and imported products are perfect substitutes), then the effect on
domestic output and trade flows would be greater.  For a given tariff change, therefore, a larger
elasticity of substitution would bring about greater changes to domestic output and trade but a lower
impact on economic welfare.  
Pig iron is generally viewed as a relative homogeneous commodity, in which case the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign iron would be very high.  Yet there are also reasons to
expect that this elasticity would be far from infinite.  Imperfect substitutability may reflect not only
differences in product quality and price, but also delivery, convenience, and transport charges that-10-
14  The Armington framework assumes that the utility derived from the domestic and imported
goods is weakly separable from total utility, such that the marginal rate of substitution between the two
goods is independent of consumption of other goods.  Demand is also assumed to be homothetic so
that the relative market shares are independent of total expenditure on the goods.  
make domestic and imported pig iron, to some degree, different commodities.  Even today, as
Jondrow, Chase, and Gamble (1982) document, long supply lags and supply uncertainty associated
with purchasing iron and steel from foreign producers imply imperfect substitutability between similar
product categories in the iron and steel industry.  As a result, empirical research on international trade
takes the elasticity of substitution as a parameter to be estimated.  
A.  Estimation Approach
One estimation approach is based on the Armington (1969) assumption that products are
differentiated by country of origin;  see, e.g., Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) and Blonigen and
Wilson (1999).  A country’s consumers are assumed to derive utility from consuming a composite of
domestic and imported goods that are linked in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functional
form.14  A typical CES representation is 
Q = "[$M(F-1)/F + (1-$)D(F-1)/F]F/(F-1), 
where Q is the composite quantity of pig iron demanded, M is the quantity of imported pig iron, D is the
quantity of domestic pig iron for domestic consumption, " and $ are calibrated parameters, and F is
the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic pig iron.
Given the prices of domestic and imported pig iron (denoted pD and pM) and a desired level of
Q, expenditure minimization results in the following expression:  
M/D=[($/(1-$))(pD/pM)]F.  -11-
After taking logs, this yields a standard equation to estimate the elasticity of substitution:
log [M/D]t = F log [$/(1-$)] + F log [pD/pM]t + ,t.
While instrumental variables estimation is not frequently employed in estimating this equation, pD and pM
can be treated as endogenous and materials and factor costs (both domestic and imported) can be used
as instruments. 
One concern about using estimated parameters to evaluate the effects of a policy change is the
extent to which different parameter estimates could result from different model specifications.  Shiells,
Stern and Deardorff (1986) propose an alternative method of estimating the elasticity of substitution
that employs a more flexible demand system.  They estimate the following equation:
log (M)t = " + 0MD log (pD/pCPI)t + 0M log (pM/pCPI)t + ( log (y)t + 8 log (M)t-1 + <t,
where pD/pCPI and pM/pCPI are relative prices (domestic and import prices divided by some domestic
price index), y is total domestic expenditures on pig iron (i.e., demand is potentially non-homothetic),
and a lagged dependent variable is included to account for partial adjustment.  The elasticity of
substitution can be calculated from the estimated parameters as F = 0MD/2D + (, where 2D is the
share of total spending on pig iron devoted to domestic production, 0MD is the cross-price elasticity of
demand for imported pig iron, and ( is the elasticity of demand for imported pig iron with respect to
total pig iron expenditures.
Both the Armington and the Shiells-Stern-Deardorff methods were used to estimate the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign pig iron to determine if these methods yielded
similar results.  The data are based on annual time series from 1867-1889.  (The data sources are
described more fully in an appendix.)  Figure 1 presents the domestic and foreign prices of pig iron and-12-
15  One cannot reject the hypothesis of that the demand elasticities sum to zero, i.e., that import
demand is homogeneous of degree zero and there is no money illusion.  A Wald test of 0MD  + 0M + (
= 0 yields an F statistic of 0.21 and an associated p-value of 0.65.
16  These estimates are quite similar to contemporary estimates for iron and steel products. 
Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986) estimate an elasticity of substitution of 2.986 for steel mill products
using annual data from 1962-78, and Reinert and Roland-Host (1992) estimate the elasticity of 3.08 for
iron and steel foundry products using quarterly data from 1980-88. 
shows how the relative price of domestic pig iron evolved during this period.  Figure 2 depicts the
import market share during this period.  The results are presented on Table 1.  Columns (1)-(3) reports
the results from the Armington specification.  Column (1) finds an elasticity of 2.25, which increases
slightly to 2.56 if one instruments for the relative prices.  Column (3) indicates that this finding is robust
to the inclusion of a time trend.  
Columns (4) and (5) report results, without and with instruments, arising from the Sheills-
Stern-Deardorff approach.  According to the column (5) results, the short-run cross price elasticity of
import demand is 2.24, which (taking 2D as 0.98 and ( as 0.62) implies an elasticity of substitution of
2.9.  Using the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to solve for the long-run elasticities yields a
long-run cross price elasticity of 5.10 and an implied elasticity of substitution of 6.6.15
Both estimation methods yield an elasticity of substitution of about 2.5 to 3.0, although the long-
run elasticity could be as high as 6 to 7.16  As a sensitivity check on the simulations below, results will
be reported using both the lower and the higher elasticity values. 
B.  The Geography of Protection
A frequently mentioned hypothesis regarding protection during this period related to the
geographic impact of protection.  High transportation costs were thought to insulate iron and steel-13-
17  Taussig (1915, pp. 145-46), for example, states that “had there been no duty on iron, the
price at the seaboard would unquestionably have been lower than it was . . . The freight changes from
the seaboard would have impeded competition from imported iron, raising the price at which it could
then be supplied . . .the free admission of iron, while it might have caused prices to be lower, would at
no time . . . have caused a decline in the heart of the country by the full amount of the duty in force.” 
Warren (1973, p. 14) also suggests that interior producers may have been less efficient because of their
inability to serve a large market:  “Distance protected the interior producer but the same isolation forced
small-scale operations on him.”
18  Report of the Special Commissioner of Revenue for the year 1869, p. 83.  
producers in the interior of the United States from foreign competition.  Hence, a tariff reduction might
adversely affect producers along the east coast, but would have little impact on producers west of the
Appalachian mountains.17 
This view was fully debated at the time of the Wells reports.  Wells had written that “if the duty
on pig iron were entirely removed, the American producer in the interior would still enjoy a protection
in the cost of transportation to the extent of at least $1.50 per ton for every one hundred miles that
intervene between the place of production and the port of entry, which circumstances renders the
transport of a single pound of foreign pig iron to any considerable distance into the interior a matter of
ordinary commercial impossibility.”18  Seeking to rebut this claim, the Committee on Manufactures in
Congress collected evidence that pig iron imported into such ports as New York, New Orleans, and
Montreal could ship the goods to interior cities such as Cleveland, St. Louis, and Chicago at much
lower rates.  Whereas Wells’s figures implied a $11.40 per ton cost of moving pig iron from Montreal
to Chicago, for example, the committee’s evidence suggested the actual figure was closer to $2 to $3
per ton.  The committee called Wells’s discussion of freight rates most unfair and condemned him for
“conspicuous disregard of facts easily procurable.”   -14-
19  According to the Census of 1870, for example, the value of products in the iron and steel
industry was 6 percent of total manufacturing output, and employment in iron and steel was 4 percent of
total manufacturing employment.  These figures for iron and steel include much more than just the output
and employment of the pig iron industry.  
If transport costs protected interior producers from foreign competition, then domestic
production in those regions should be less sensitive to import price movements than that located closer
to the eastern seaboard.  This hypothesis can be evaluated by estimating the elasticity of substitution
(between domestic production and imports) on a regional basis.  Table 2 presents estimates of the
elasticity using regional production of pig iron.  What is quickly apparent is that there is no statistically
significant difference in the regional elasticities of substitution.  While the elasticity is highest in the South,
suggesting that producers there would have been slightly more vulnerable to any tariff reduction than
producers located elsewhere, the magnitude of this effect is not substantial.  This finding supports
Congress’s view that navigable rivers ensured that producers in the American hinterland were not
immune from import competition in iron.  To the extent that transportation costs insulated some
producers from foreign competition, that effect could be manifest in different regional levels of
production rather than in different regional elasticities of substitution.  
IV.  Effect of the Tariff on Prices, Production, Imports, and Welfare 
This section takes a standard, simple partial equilibrium model that is frequently used in trade
policy analysis and applies it to the post-Civil War pig iron industry.  The pig iron industry is considered
small enough relative to the overall economy to justify a partial, rather than a general equilibrium,
approach.19  The basic model treats domestic and imported goods as imperfect substitutes, and-15-
20  The structure of the model also has some similarities to that used by Fogel and Engerman
(1969) in their examination of the growth of the antebellum iron industry.
21  The reader is invited to consult Francois and Hall for complete details on the structure of the
model.  See also www.intereconomics.com for spreadsheet applications.
provides a comparative static analysis of tariff changes on prices, production, imports, and welfare.  A
brief, non-technical sketch of the model will be presented here, but a more detailed description of the
model can be found in Rousslang and Suomela (1988), Jones (1993), and Francois and Hall (1997).20  
The model assumes that domestic consumers demand a product that can be supplied by
domestic and foreign producers.  When the tariff on imports is reduced, the domestic price of imports
falls by a magnitude determined by the extent of the tariff reduction and the elasticities of foreign supply
and consumer demand.  This price reduction decreases demand for the domestic substitute good by a
magnitude determined by the elasticity of substitution in consumer demand.  As a result, domestic
production falls and domestic producers’s surplus is lost, while imports rise and domestic consumers’s
surplus is gained.  
To make the model operational, it is calibrated using market data for a benchmark year and
then subjected to exogenous policy changes whose effects work through the specified (and constant)
elasticities of domestic and foreign supply and consumer demand, in addition to the elasticity of
substitution.  The underlying supply and demand equations are often taken as linear (or log linear) in
prices for computational simplicity, but then the results can be misleading when considering large policy
changes because they are based on local approximations of small changes in the exogenous variables. 
Therefore, to consider the impact of large policy shocks, such as free trade, the non-linear model set
out explicitly in Francois and Hall (1997, pp. 139-140) is employed here.21  As just noted, however,-16-
22  According to the 1880 Census (1883, II, p. 9), “All iron and steel products were in such
demand by American consumers that the iron and steel works of this country were unable to meet it. 
The home supply was supplemented by large importations, and even these could not be made with
sufficient rapidity to meet the urgent wants of consumers.” 
additional information on those elasticity values is required before implementing the model.  
A.  Other Elasticity Parameters
Aside from benchmark values of production and imports, three additional parameters are
required to calibrate the model: the elasticity of total domestic demand for pig iron (regardless of
source), and the elasticities of domestic supply and foreign export supply.  
Francois and Hall (1997, p. 138) show that the elasticity of (composite) pig iron demand (0Q)
can be represented by the following relationship:  0Q = (0MD/2D) - F.  Taking 2D as 0.98 (the sample
average), the results from column (5) of Table 1 imply that the short-run value of 0Q is -0.6 and the
long run value 0Q is -1.4.
The elasticities of domestic supply and foreign export supply are also important parameters. 
The former determines the extent to which a tariff-induced fall in domestic prices translates into lower
domestic output, and the latter indicates any foreign supply constraints that might generate adverse
terms-of-trade effects from lower tariffs.  Along with other corroborative evidence, a major demand
shock — the great “iron famine” of 1879-80 — helps identify these elasticities.  The “iron famine” was
a large, unanticipated shock to U.S. demand, starting in the spring of 1879 and continuing through
1880.  The demand surge could not be met through domestic production and drove domestic prices
and imports up dramatically.22  The price of domestic pig iron rose 62 percent, from $17.63 per ton in
1878 to $28.5 per ton in 1880, as depicted in Figure 1.  This exogenous event helps identify the impact-17-
of U.S. demand shocks (due to tariff change or otherwise) on import prices.  Pig iron imports jumped
by a factor of seven, from roughly 71,000 tons in 1878 to nearly 600,000 tons in 1880.  Yet the pig
iron export price of Britain, the dominant source of U.S. pig iron imports, rose by less than 20 percent
between 1878 and 1880.  The implied export supply elasticity is nearly 40.  This overstates the true
elasticity because the price of U.S. producers was not held constant in this experiment. In the
simulations considered below, the foreign supply elasticity will be taken as 15; there is no significant
change to any of the results for elasticity values above 10.  
Is such a large export supply elasticity plausible?  In 1878, on the eve of the American “iron
famine,” just 0.5 percent of Britain’s pig iron production (and 3.5 percent of its exports) was destined
to the United States.  U.S. demand comprised a small part of Britain’s overall production, whereas
Britain supplied more than half of U.S. imports in 1875, and consistently more than 80 percent after
1880.  A modest diversion of British output to the United States would therefore translate into an
enormous increase in U.S. imports.  Indeed, the tremendous demand shock in 1879-80 resulted in 8
percent of British production (38 percent of exports) being sent to the United States, but by 1884 after
demand cooled just 2 percent of British production was exported to the United States (Carr and Taplin
1962, pp. 165, 167).  That such large quantities were shuffled between markets with only a muted
effect on British prices indicates a high export elasticity and relatively minor terms of trade effects.  This
interpretation is consistent with Taussig’s (1915, p. 146) assessment:  “During the first decade of the
[post-Civil War] period, say until the year 1880, it is not unlikely that Great Britain could have sent to
the United States all the iron that would have been imported there, if free of duty, without such pressure
on the British coal and iron mines as to have caused enhanced cost and permanently enhanced-18-
23  After 1880, however, Taussig believed that the United States did possess some terms of
trade power with respect to Britain: “with the extraordinary increase in the American demand after
1880, the additional quantity could not have been supplied from Great Britain except on harder terms .
. . . [then] it is probable that the removal of the duty and the consequent demand on Great Britain for
iron would have caused the price of British iron to go up. . . . A great increase in the demand on the
British iron masters for iron, consequent on the absence of the American duty and the lessening of
American product, might have raised the price in Great Britain, not only temporarily, but over the whole
period.”  By 1890s, however, the United States had acquired a comparative advantage in pig iron and
became a net exporter.  
prices.”23  
There are no existing estimates of the elasticity of domestic supply of pig iron, although Temin
(1964, p. 213) says it “seems likely” that “the domestic supply curves for iron and steel producers were
either very elastic or else expanding rapidly enough to have the same effect.” An econometric effort to
determine the elasticity of domestic supply (results not reported here) resulted in an estimate of 0.8,
which initially strikes one as implausibly inelastic.  Yet using the “iron famine” demand shock to identify
the domestic supply elasticity, we find that between 1878 and 1880 the domestic price rose 62 percent
while domestic output rose 67 percent, implying a supply elasticity of 1.08.  Using different base and
end years does not change this finding significantly: between 1879 and 1880, the implied supply
elasticity is 1.22, while over the longer period between 1879 and 1881 the implied supply elasticity is
3.04.  This experiment does not hold the price of foreign goods constant, however, and therefore
overstates the true elasticity.  Yet much smaller elasticities generate an extreme insensitivity of domestic
output to domestic prices and would also mean that tariff changes would have little impact on domestic
output.  In the simulations below, therefore, the short-run elasticity of domestic supply is assumed to be
1.1 and the long-run elasticity is assumed to be 3.0.  -19-
B.  Simulated Effects of Tariff Changes 
Having settled upon a set of approximate elasticity values, the effects of tariff reduction on
resource allocation and economic welfare can be evaluated.  The base year is chosen to be 1869.  In
that year, domestic consumption of pig iron was approximately $63.6 million, of which $58.9 million
arose from domestic production and $4.7 million from imports.  The import market share, by value,
was 7.4 percent.  The average ad valorem tariff applied to pig iron imports was about 60 percent. 
There is nothing particularly unrepresentative about this benchmark year when compared with adjacent
years (in terms of business cycle effects or abnormal import market share), and it is chosen because it
occurs at the height of the political controversy over post-Civil War tariffs reductions, but is also before
the 1870 tariff reduction.  
Table 3 presents the results for three counterfactual policy scenarios: (i) a reduction of the tariff
from 60 percent to 47 percent, corresponding to the actual 22 percent tariff cut (from $9 to $7 per ton)
implemented in 1870; (ii) a tariff reduction from 60 percent to 20 percent, corresponding to the Wells
proposal for a 67 percent tariff cut (from $9 to $3 per ton); (iii) a tariff reduction from 60 percent to 0
percent, corresponding to free trade.  For each of these scenarios, the short-run and long-run impacts
are considered using the short-run and long-run elasticities described above.  
Columns (1) and (2) consider the actual tariff cut implemented in 1870.  The short-run and
long-run response indicates that the domestic price falls by a trivial amount (less than 1 percent) and, as
a result, domestic output declines by less than 2 percent in the long-run.  Domestic output falls more in
the long run scenario because of the larger elasticity of supply, but also cushions the fall in domestic
prices, which explains why the price decline is slightly lower in the long-run.  The large elasticity of-20-
supply from the rest of the world implies that import prices rise only slightly (about 2 percent) with the
tariff reduction.  
Why are these effects so small?  Even though the tariff is reduced by 22 percent, the domestic
price of imports only falls by about 6 to 7 percent.  At most, with a perfectly elastic supply of imports,
the domestic price of imports would be expected to fall only 9 percent, calculated as (1 +
t1870)/(1+t1869)-1, or (1.47/1.60)-1 = -0.09.  If imports prices rise slightly as a result of the tariff change,
the domestic price would not fall by quite this amount, which explains the 6 to 7 percent decline in the
simulation.  As a result of the tariff reduction, the volume of imports rises by 20 percent in the short-run
and by 40 percent in the long-run.  While this sounds impressive, imports are quite small in comparison
to domestic production.  In fact, the import share of the domestic market only rises from 7.4 percent to
just under 10 percent.  
This ceteris paribus counterfactual is not, of course, directly comparable to the actual outcome
observed, but it tempting to undertake such a comparison despite the fact that many things other than
the tariff changed between 1869 and 1870.  In 1870, when the tariff cut was implemented, overall pig
iron consumption fell by 1.5 percent, suggesting a slight cyclical downturn during this period.   Both
domestic production and prices fell by 2.7 percent while the volume of imports rose about 14 percent,
increasing its market share by about one percentage point.  This outcome is somewhat reassuring in
view of the above results.  In the absence of the industry recession, one can imagine the actual outcome
having been quite comparable in magnitude to the results found here:  domestic prices would not have
fallen quite as much, and imports would have been slightly larger, closer to the figures found in the
simulation.  -21-
Panel B of Table 3 considers the welfare effects stemming from this tariff change.  The terms of
trade losses are minuscule in comparison to the welfare gains from reducing the deadweight production
and consumption losses associated with the high initial tariff.  The long- run welfare gain of $2 million is
approximately 1/30th of the value of total domestic expenditures on pig iron.  
Under the Wells proposal for a 67 percent tariff cut (from 60 percent to 20 percent), the
simulations suggest that domestic prices would fall by as much as 3 percent and domestic output by as
much as 10 percent.  If the tariff reduction fully passed through to domestic prices, then the domestic
price of imported pig iron would be expected to fall by 25 percent (calculated as [1.20/1.60]-1 = -
0.25), but due to the slightly higher import prices the simulated fall is about 20 percent.  The long-run
welfare gain is about $8 million, or 13 percent of total expenditures on pig iron.  
Would this nearly 25 percent fall in the domestic price of imported pig iron really translate into
just a 10 percent decline in domestic output, raising the import market share (by value) from about 7
percent to about 18 percent?  To be sure, imports in this case surge up to about 200 percent, but that
still translates into a relatively modest change in the market share.  Somewhat corroborative evidence
comes from the experience in 1878-80.  Then the price of domestic pig iron rose by a factor of 3 in
comparison to the price of imported pig iron, as Figure 1 indicates, yet the market share of imports (by
volume) rose from 3 percent to just 13 percent, as shown in Figure 2.  Domestic consumers were
apparently willing to pay a substantial premium for domestic pig iron even though they were free to
import foreign pig iron at the world price plus the tariff.  This actual experience is somewhat reassuring
in that it adds to the plausibility of the simulations here.
Finally, if the tariff had been simply abolished, as considered in columns 4 and 5, domestic pig-22-
iron production could have fallen by about 15 percent (long run response).  The most import prices
could have fall is 37.5 percent, but again the less than perfectly elastic supply of exports means that
import prices fall by about 30 percent here.  The market share of imports rises to nearly 30 percent. 
Thus, even with free trade, domestic producers retain a substantial portion of the domestic market.  
The last column considers a worst-case scenario from the standpoint of the domestic industry: 
free trade in the context of the perfect substitutes model.  In this limiting case, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported pig iron is infinite.  In this situation, domestic output falls by
50 percent and imports capture about 70 percent of the domestic market.  The welfare gains to pig iron
consumers, however, is much larger in this instance. 
C.  Discussion of Results
What is striking about the results presented above is the relatively muted effects of tariff
changes on the domestic industry.  This suggests that a substantial portion of the U.S. pig iron industry
could have survived much steeper tariff reductions than actually implemented, and that the adverse
terms of trade effects of tariff reduction would have been trivial.  To some extent, the limited
substitutability of domestic and imported pig iron in consumption generates this result.  Imperfect
substitutability is not driving all of the results, however, because even with perfect substitutability about
half of the industry’s output would continue to be produced even under free trade.  
Although the imperfect substitutes trade model is a standard one in contemporary trade policy
analysis, participants in the nineteenth-century debate would dispute several aspects of its structure and
would therefore dissent from its implications.  William “Pig Iron” Kelley and other tariff proponents
would argue that protection would not result in permanently high domestic prices because the tariff-23-
would eventually reduce prices.  Yet, indisputable, U.S. pig iron prices substantially exceeded U.K.
prices for several decades until the end of the century;  one can argue about whether 30 years is a short
or long period and whether the tariff was principally responsible for this price decline.  Kelley would
also argue that import prices would not fall with lower tariffs because foreign producers would simply
exploit their market power and raise prices.  If true, this proposition creates a contradiction for the
protectionist position:  if the lost tariff revenue is merely soaked up by foreign exporters who raise their
export prices, then lower tariffs might be welfare-worsening but would not harm the domestic industry
since domestic prices would not fall.  Yet there is little evidence that British iron and steel exporters
exercised significant market power.  They appear to be highly competitive with one another and with
other producers in Germany, Belgium, and elsewhere (Carr and Taplin 1962).  
Revenue Commissioner David Wells would contend that the tariff reduction would not reduce
domestic output because producers could survive by cutting their prices and accepting lower profits,
since (by his reckoning) the world price was roughly the same as their costs.  Yet if pig iron producers
were reaping such large profits, as Wells suggested, why were these profits not dissipated through
greater output among existing producers or additional market entry?  Surely there must have been some
elements of increasing costs in the industry or some marginal suppliers who did not wish to produce
more at existing prices.  If domestic prices were, in fact, to decline as a result of a tariff reduction, then
these marginal suppliers would have reduced their output or have gone out of business.  
While the possible objections from the nineteenth century interested parties do not appear
compelling, this last point highlights one of several shortcoming of the model.  One shortcoming is the
inability of the model to describe the dynamic adjustment of domestic firms to the tariff reduction.  The-24-
model here does not indicate how the industry would become rationalized in light of the greater foreign
competition.  Temin (1964, p. 167) notes that “the growth of the iron and steel industry in the late
nineteenth century was accomplished through a growth in the size of plants rather than through an
expansion in the number of plants.”  We do not know, however, if downsizing in the industry would be
accomplished by the same firms producing less output or by fewer firms producing about the same level
of output.  
Second, there is a question of whether abandoning protection for pig iron producers would
have jeopardized iron and steel producers due to linkages between the sectors.  Census data do not
provide details on the degree to which pig iron and final goods producers were linked through vertical
integration.  Temin (1964, p. 111) suggests that during this early period most producers were not
vertically integrated:  “. . . iron was cast into pigs as it came from the blast furnace and could be
transported easily in that form.   In fact, the Trenton Iron Company’s blast furnaces were fifty miles
away from its rolling mills. . . . the market for pig iron was competitive in nature, with most of the blast
furnaces selling their production the open market . . . . less than one-fourth of the pig iron produced in
1860 was made by integrated firms.”  By the time of the U.S. Steel consolidation in 1901, however,
most iron and steel producers were vertically integrated due to the economies of casting hot pig iron
into its final form.  If firms were not vertically integrated but could purchase pig iron on the open
market, then pig iron protection would have operated as tax on purchasing sectors.  Irwin (2000), for
example, describes how domestic tinplate production did not require vertical integration and was clearly
harmed by the negative effective protection it received as a result of the higher domestic price of iron.
Finally, would the domestic industry have enjoyed its tremendous growth during and after the-25-
1880s had it been much smaller in size due to low tariffs?  The boom in railroad construction and in the
demand for other iron and steel products was exogenous to the domestic pig iron industry and almost
surely would have occurred regardless of the height of U.S. tariffs.  The question is the degree to which
the domestic industry would have participated in this boom had tariffs been lower.  The model here
simply yields a one-time level effect on domestic output from tariff reduction.  Unless there is some
dynamic aspects of production or hysteresis in capacity investment choices, then the industry would
have grown with domestic demand but just have a smaller share of the market.  In considering the steel
rail industry, Head (1994) introduces industry dynamics in the form of national learning by doing. 
Under that assumption, a change in trade policy can have persistent (and not one-off) effects on the
industry evolution.  In the case of pig iron, Allen (1977) finds that most productivity improvements in
the pig iron industry during the 1880s were due to changes in the engineering and chemical aspects of
resource use and production, unlikely to have been directly touched by changes in trade policy.  
V.  Conclusions
The effects of tariff policy on U.S. industrialization in the mid- to late-nineteenth century has
remained an open question among economic historians.  The analysis in this paper suggests that, had the
tariff been eliminated in 1869, domestic output would fall by about 15 percent and the import market
share would rise from about 7 percent to nearly 30 percent.  These relatively modest effects suggest
that a substantial portion of the domestic industry could have survived a significant tariff reduction. 
While there has been relatively little work by economic historians on post-Civil War trade policy, these
findings are comparable to other results from the antebellum period.  Harley (1992) finds that between-26-
one-third and one-half of U.S. manufacturing would have been eliminated had import tariffs been
abolished in 1859, Fogel and Engerman (1969) report that domestic competition was more important
than imports or tariff policy in determining the fate of the charcoal iron industry, and Engerman (1971)
find that tariff policy was much less important than British iron prices in determining the volume of U.S.
imports.  These findings are broadly consistent with the results of the simulations performed here. -27-
Data Appendix
The price of domestic pig iron is that of no. 1 anthracite foundry pig iron at Philadelphia as
reported by the American Iron and Steel Institute and published in the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1893 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1894), p. 339.  This is the longest consistent, readily available
time series data on U.S. pig iron prices.  The price of foreign pig iron is no. 3 pig iron at Cleveland
(U.K.) as reported in B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p. 763.  This time series is highly correlated with two other potential series,
U.K exports prices from Britain’s Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, various years
(where the correlation is 0.98 over 1867-1889) and U.S. pig iron import prices (correlation 0.82)
which includes all sources of imports. 
The volume of U.S. production and imports of pig iron (in tons) is taken from Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1879 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1880), p. 134 and Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1893 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1894), p. 221.  The regional production figures
are also found from this source, but various years must be consulted to generate a complete time series. 
A question can be raised about a potential bias in the estimate of the elasticity of substitution due to
imports of basic versus spiegeleisen pig iron.  This should not be a concern in the period under
consideration here.  In 1876, only about 8 percent of pig iron imports (by quantity and value) was
spiegeleisen.  In 1883, 84 percent of pig iron imports (by quantity) and 74 percent of imports by value
were non-spiegeleisen.  By 1889, the value and the quantity of spiegeleisen imports exceeded those of
regular pig iron and became dominant by mid-1890s.  This is one reason for ending the sample at the
end of the 1880s.
The domestic price of iron ore is that of old range Bessemer ores as reported in Lake Superior
Iron Ore Association, Lake Superior Iron Ores (Cleveland, 1938), p. 322.  The foreign (U.K.) price of
iron ore is the unit value import price taken from the Great Britain’s Central Statistical Office, Annual
Abstract of Statistics, various years.  Imported iron ore in Britain was the marginal source of supply and
comprised nearly half of domestic consumption of ore.  The price of coal in the United States is that of
anthracite coal (Schuylkill whiteash lump coal at Philadelphia) from the reports of the American Iron
and Steel Association as reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1893, p. 338.  The
price of coal in the United Kingdom is average export price taken from B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of
British Historical Statistics (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 748.  This series is
highly correlated with the index of pithead coal prices in B. R. Mitchell, Economic Development of the
British Coal Industry, 1800-1914 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 54.  The annual
sterling-dollar exchange rate is taken from Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p. 702. 
The U.S. consumer price index is taken from P. A. David and P. Solar, “A Bicentenary Contribution to
the History of the Cost of Living in America,” Research in Economic History Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: 
JAI Press, 1977), pp. 1-80.  -28-
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Table 1: Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution between Domestic and Imported Pig Iron
Sample period is 1867 to 1889.  Standard errors are corrected for heterskedasticity.  Instruments include
domestic and imported iron ore and coal prices, domestic expenditures on pig iron, and the sterling-dollar




























Time -- -- -0.01
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Adj. R2 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.76 0.65
Instruments No Yes Yes No Yes
AR (1) Correction No No No Yes Yes-31-
Table 2: Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution by Region 
Standard errors are corrected for heterskedasticity.  Dependent variable is log (M/D), where M is volume
of imported pig iron and D is volume of domestic production, by region.  East Coast includes production in
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Maryland, and Virginia.  Interior includes Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky.
Midwest includes Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan.  South includes Alabama and Tennessee.  Data are only

































Adj. R2 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31-32-
Table 3: Estimated Effects of Tariff Removal circa 1869
Assumptions: The benchmark pig iron tariff in 1869 was 60%.  The actual tariff cut was to 47%; the Wells proposals was for a tariff of 20%, and free trade is a tariff
of 0%.  The short-run elasticity assumptions are:  F=3, 0Q =-0.6, ,US=1.1, ,*=15.  The long-run elasticity assumptions are:  F=6.6, 0Q =-1.4, ,US=3, ,*=15.   The value
of domestic output is $58.9 million and the value of imports is $4.7 million. 






















Percent Change in Domestic
Pig Iron Price  -0.7% -0.5% -2.8% -2.6% -5.7% -5.5% -25.1%
Percent Change in Shipments
of Domestic Pig Iron  -0.8% -1.7% -3.0% -7.7% -5.5% -15.8% -53.9%
Percent Change in Border Price
of Imported Pig Iron  1.3% 2.4% 4.3% 7.9% 6.9% 12.6% 19.3%
Percent Change in Internal
Price of Imported Pig Iron  -6.9% -5.9% -21.8% -19.1% -33.2% -29.7% -25.1%
Percent Change in Imports of
Pig Iron  20.6% 42.0% 86.6% 213.1% 171.7% 489.1% 1,323.8%
Import Market Share 
(by value)
(1869 = 7.4%)
8.3% 9.8% 11.0% 18.4% 13.9% 29.4% 70.5%-33-
Table 3, Continued
B.  Welfare Effects (in millions of dollars)
Deadweight Loss Triangles $1.09 $2.29  $3.70 $8.88 $6.04 $16.30 $41.70
Terms of Trade Effect -$0.00 -$0.00 -$0.06 -$0.06 -$0.20 -$0.37 -$0.57
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Relative Price of U.S. Pig Iron, 1867-1889
Figure 2